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Abstract
It is becoming increasingly common for institutions to use statistics to in-
form policy decisions. We should be prepared to ask ourselves what reg-
ulatory principles should be imposed on institutions that seek to justify
certain policies through deference to a statistical analysis. This paper will
examine the difficulties that come with using statistics to justify actions,
and argue that certain standards of transparency and verifiability should
be expected from any institution that seeks to involve a statistical analysis
in the formation of policies. I will first use Market Share Liability, an es-
tablished use of statistics, to draw out what responsibilities an institution
might have regarding the collection and presentation of statistics. Then, I
will propose a system that aims to prevent abusive applications of statis-
tics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I am concerned with how we use statistics to justify institutional actions.
As our capacity to collect and analyze data grows, it is natural for us to
be concerned with the appropriate bounds of data collection and analy-
sis. Concerns about privacy and consent are commonplace, and new pro-
posals for integrating data driven technologies are being proposed both
by large companies and governments. In this paper, I argue that provid-
ing statistical justifications for institutional actions require specific trans-
parency and verifiability criteria that are entirely separate from concerns
over privacy and consent, and propose a system that aims to prevent abu-
sive applications of statistics.
In Chapter 1, I will introduce my motivation and identify the problem
at hand. I will do this by reviewing common issues raised with data collec-
tion and analysis, and then describing an abuse of statistics that lies out-
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side of these issues. The abuse of statistics I am interested in are attempts
by institutions to justify actions by claiming deference to a statistic. I will
end with a discussion of why I suspect institutional abuses of statistics de-
serve special attention over the common worries of accuracy, privacy, and
consent.
In Chapter 2, I will introduce a legal case that established a court use
of statistics on the market share of a harmful product, and identify exactly
what justifies the court in using this statistic to inform legal punishment.
The upshot of this examination into an established use of statistics in law
will be to show that institutions inherit some responsibilities beyond re-
sponsibilities of privacy and security if they expect the public to believe
that their policies are informed purely by a statistical analysis.
In Chapter 3, I will introduce a case where an institution attempts
to justify a policy using a statistic, and then argue that this justification
should not be compelling. By appealing to the inherited responsibilities
of institutions discussed in Chapter 2, I will identify what is going wrong
with our current view of statistics as justification for policies.
In Chapter 4, I will discuss other cases where the unjustified use of
statistics identified in Chapter 3 may appear, such as in employment and
police practices.
I will conclude with some comments on avenues for future work, and
a short comment on what we should be prepared to see in the immediate
future regarding the use of statistics by institutions.
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1.1 Problems of Accuracy and Interpretation
The first class of concerns I would like to address are concerns about accu-
racy and misinterpretation. It is common knowledge that it is easy to mis-
lead using legitimate statistics, and our legal systems have had to guard
against misinterpretations in the past. As an example, consider the case of
Dr. Meadow and Sally Clark.
Dr. Meadow was a British Pediatrician interested in Sudden In-
fant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in the U.K. While he was already
known for his work on Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, he
began a run as an expert witness on SIDS, attending to cases of
multiple SIDS deaths in families. He reasoned that because the
chance of having one SIDS death in a wealthy family with no
smokers was 1 in 8,500, the chance of having two SIDS deaths
in the same family must be about 1 in 72,000,000, a figure ob-
tained by squaring the 1 in 8,500 figure. Using this statistic, Dr.
Meadow testified that Sally Clark, a mother of two deceased
infants, was probably responsible for killing her children. Sally
Clark was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison, failing
her first appeal. Her second appeal was successful, and Sally
Clark was released, but Sally Clark would soon die of acute al-
cohol intoxication after suffering the death of her two children,
a miscarriage of justice, and poor treatment at the prison due
to inmates and staff believing her to be a child murderer.1
This case is often cited as a prime example of an abuse of statistics in
the court room. Dr. Meadow made two major mistakes.
1Court of Appeal[2000]: Clark, R v [2000] EWCA Crim
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The first mistake is assuming that SIDS deaths in a family are inde-
pendent. An assumption that two events are independent means that the
occurrence of one event does not affect the probability of the occurrence
of the other event. This is an unsupported assumption in the SIDS case as
studies suggest a connection between SIDS and a host of related compli-
cations, many of which have a genetic or environmental basis.
The second mistake is not considering that, even if granted that the 1
in 72,000,000 figure was correct, the alternative explanation provided, a
double homicide, also has an extremely low a priori probability, and it is
not clear that the the low probability of one explanation implies the high
probability of the other explanation.
This seems like a clear case of an abuse of statistics, but the response
to this kind of issue with statistical evidence seems just to be more careful
when applying and interpreting statistics. At face value, this issue could
be fixed by a more rigorous education in statistics.
Related to issues of Accuracy and interpretation are issues of Practi-
cality, where we are concerned with the feasibility of constructing useful
statistical tests. To illustrate this, consider the following excerpt from Little
Brother, a young adult book by Cory Doctorow, science-fiction author and
digital rights advocate.
If you ever decide to do something as stupid as build an au-
tomatic terrorism detector, here‘s a math lesson you need to
learn first. It’s called “the paradox of the false positive,” and
it‘s a doozy.
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Say you have a new disease, called Super-AIDS. Only one in a
million people gets Super-AIDS. You develop a test for Super-
AIDS that’s 99 percent accurate. I mean, 99 percent of the time,
it gives the correct result - true if the subject is infected, and
false if the subject is healthy. You give the test to a million peo-
ple.
One in a million people have Super-AIDS. One in a hundred
people that you test will generate a ”false positive” – the test
will say he has Super-AIDS even though he doesn’t. That’s
what “99 percent accurate” means: one percent wrong.
What’s one percent of one million?
1, 000, 000/100 = 10, 000
One in a million people has Super-AIDS. If you test a million
random people, you’ll probably only find one case of real Super-
AIDS. But your test won’t identify one person as having Super-
AIDS. It will identify 10,000 people as having it.
Your 99 percent accurate test will perform with 99.99 percent
inaccuracy. 2
Here, Doctorow is making a practical complaint against statistical tests
that aim to identify individuals with a characteristic that has a very low
rate of incidence. A terrorism statistical test, due to the extraordinarily
low rate of incidence, must have an incredibly high rate of success if the
test is to be deployed onto a large population. Again, we are faced with
a clear problem for the use of statistics, but once more, the solution to
the problem seems clear. The challenge is to be aware of the rate of false
positives and account for it when calculating the success of a test.
2Cory Doctorow, Little Brother (New York: Tom Doherty Associates LLC), 47.
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The two problems presented, while genuine problems, already have
much discussion on how they limit the use of statistics. For both of these
issues, the problem seems to be resolved by simply knowing more about
the nature of statistical inferences. There has already been pressure to re-
orient our public school math education to put more of an emphasis on the
interpretation of statistics, and further investigation into these problems is
probably best left to statisticians and our public education system.
1.2 Problems of Privacy and Implementation
Alright, so what of problems with statistics that are accurate and correctly
interpreted? The next class of issues I would like to address are issues of
privacy and implementation.
Examples of violation of privacy in the name of mass data collection
are easy to find, but I will present a particularly sinister application here.
In 2014, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China
released a document entitled Planning Outline for the Construc-
tion of a Social Credit System. In it, China describes a system
designed to foster trust and good citizenship amongst Chinese
citizens through the use of a credit score. This system would
be mandatory for all Chinese citizens by 2020, although the ar-
ticle does not mention specifics on how the government plans
to phase in this new credit system. One year after this planning
document was published, Chinese mega-corporations Tencent
and Alibaba jointly announced the release of Sesame Credit,
a credit system in line with the description provided by the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 7
Chinese Government, with some concerning twists. Unlike
the American Fico credit score, Sesame Credit’s credit score in-
corporates information from online purchases and activity on
social networks, along with the standard information on loan
payments and financial assets. The rewards for high scores are
also unusual, affecting a Chinese citizen’s eligibility for a pan-
European Visa, access to shorter lines at national airports, and
travel permits to Singapore. This is all in service to China’s
stated goal of “establishing the idea of an sincerity culture, and
carrying forward sincerity and traditional virtues... its objec-
tive is raising the honest mentality and credit levels of the en-
tire society”, as the algorithm assigning your score is meant to
measure good citizenship by sourcing information about your
daily habits.3
This proposed social credit system contains all kinds of potential breaches
of privacy. Although the social network information used might be pub-
lic, there is something invasive about using social networks to determine
things like personal character. There is also an intuition that the govern-
ment should not be allowed to access your purchasing history to deter-
mine what line you can wait in at an airport. Even if purchasing history
turns out to be a reasonably good indicator for good citizenship, the issue
does not rest on the accuracy or interpretation of the statistic, but rather
what the statistic demands in terms of access to personal life.
Less extreme variants of social network crawling are already in use. In
order to simplify the hiring process, many large employers have taken to
3State Council Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Construction of a
Social Credit System (2014-2020), translated by Roger Creemers
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
running resumes and applications through algorithms in order to weed
out the clearly unfit, but some companies have taken it a step further
and have almost completely automated their human resources depart-
ment. The pseudo-taxi company Uber for example, automatically fires
employees whose approval rating on their phone app dips below a certain
threshold4. Today, many admissions procedures review the social media
presence of their applicants, and although automated profile crawling is
not yet commonplace, technologies that attempt to pull information off
of profile pages are well in development. Ideally, these kinds of systems
could help remove human bias and speed up the recruitment process, but
more difficult problems of implementation and use begin to appear even
in these already accepted cases.
Another problem in the usage of automatically generated statistical re-
ports is how users know if the algorithm that is generating the reports is
malfunctioning if they have no idea how the algorithm works. As any
software engineer will tell you, keeping a program up to date with all the
relevant inputs is not a trivial task, and in order to maintain a large-scale
system like China’s Sesame Credit, we often need to rely on bug reports
from users to make sure everything is running as it should. To illustrate:
Eve and Franny are living under China’s Sesame Credit. Eve is
very knowledgable about the ins and outs of the system, and
can explain in detail how the algorithm is generating the report,
4Frank Pasquale. “Judge, Jury and Executioner: the unaccountable algorithm,” Aeon,
August 18, 2015
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and what the report should look like given a brief description
of the inputs. Franny on the other hand, knows very little about
the mechanics of how the Social Credit System works, and like
most other citizens, is only aware of very general rules that af-
fect her score. She knows for instance, that her scores tend to
rise when she pays back her debts on time, but there are fluc-
tuations in her score that she cannot explain.
When Franny engages in activity within the Sesame Credit System, she
will have a difficult time telling whether or not it is working properly. She
may not understand any bounds that the algorithm might have on its in-
puts, and thus might be misinterpreting its results. Franny’s lack of knowl-
edge impairs her ability to reflect on the decisions she might make using
this generated statistical report as she cannot be sure that the outputs of
the algorithm are appropriate, nor can she be sure that her application of
the algorithm is within its bounds. Eve, on the other hand, knows immedi-
ately when the algorithm has made a mistake and can critique its efficacy
in measuring what it attempts to measure, as Eve is privy to how and why
the judgement appears.
This is not to say that the users of automatically generated statistical re-
ports must be composed of all Eves, it just means that there must be some
Eves within the population that can act as a check on how the report gener-
ating algorithm is functioning. This means making the algorithm largely
public, allowing motivated individuals to make independent checks on
the behavior of the algorithm, allowing the algorithm to improve with
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suggestions from the Eves of the populace. The existence of Eves also al-
lows Frannys to have someone to appeal to when they believe they have
been treated unfairly. When we evaluate report generating systems, we
should ensure that enough information is made public to allow for Eves to
act as independent checks on the performance of the relevant report gen-
erating algorithm. While this still seems like a problem solvable through
education, we will be returning to a similar reason when we argue for
transparency later in this paper. However, this practical problem has a
more complicated counterpart, described by Howell in his paper Google
Morals.
Beliefs attained by deference to a statistical report can fail to
integrate with the rest of the agent’s present beliefs, and can
fail to provide the proper ground for new beliefs. This prevents
the agent from achieving higher degrees of virtue.5
Normally, we expect that judgements on other people to be integrated
with other beliefs and behaviors, and this integration can form the foun-
dation on which we synthesize new beliefs. It seems that this ability to de-
velop a sense of whatever is being measured, employability in the modern
case and good citizenship in the social credit case, is hindered by using a
statistical report without understanding its origins. If I start with defer-
ring to a statistical report, and then later decide I want to make a minor
adjustment in my evaluations due to some new experience, I have to scrap
5Robert Howell, “Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference,” Nouˆs 48:3
(2014): 389-415
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the entire report and start from scratch, because if I do not understand
how the report works, I cannot make the necessary adjustments to accom-
modate my new point of view. Using automatically generated statistical
reports does not allow for judgements to be subtly adjusted over time like
we expect judgements of mind to be.
Here we hit a problem that is closer in kind to our central problem of
interest. This is a problem that is not a practical concern, cannot be fixed by
statisticians, has little to do with the privacy or consent of whoever is being
examined by the statistic, but still points to bad consequences of a specific
abuse of statistics. Our problem of interest, which will be presented in
this next section, distinguishes itself from commonly discussed problems
about statistics in similar ways.
1.3 Our Problem
I am specifically concerned with institutions that attempt to justify their
policies and actions through the use of statistics. As an example, consider
the CVS security tag case.
In 2006, CVS fell under investigation when customers noticed
that in a selection of CVS locations, only hair products mar-
keted towards black women had an attached security tag. When
accused of racism, CVS responded that they merely make a
practice of affixing security tags to products stolen most often.
Presumably, somewhere in CVS offices, there exists a database
that keeps track of products that disappear off the shelves, and
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it is this mere deference to a statistical database that produces
this apparently horrifically racist act. Is CVS correct in thinking
that they did no wrong?6
I am bothered by this kind of deployment of statistics, but it is some-
what difficult to place why. After all, my discomfort persists even if I sup-
pose the statistic is perfectly accurate, correctly interpreted, and no em-
ployee holds a specific racist attitude. Additionally, there does not seem to
be anything that interferes with privacy or consent in the collection of the
statistic in question, as the statistic is not about customers, and rate of theft
seems like an appropriate metric to base the distribution of security tags.
However, there are a few things that hint that there is something going
wrong with this use of statistics.
First, even though we cannot definitively conclude that there are any
individuals that hold racist attitudes in CVS, we can still accuse the CVS
institution as being a racist institution. If we allow for institutions to be
racist at all, it becomes immediately apparent that a specific racist belief
or attitude in the conventional sense is not necessary to level a complaint
about racism, as institutions do not hold beliefs or attitudes in the same
way individuals do.
Second, it has become unfortunately common to use statistics to try
and end difficult conversations. Too often, questions on whether or not
racial profiling is permissible, whether or not to place travel bans on cer-
6“CVS Hair Care Products,” last modified June 22, 2014,
www.snopes.com/racial/business/cvs.asp
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tain countries, and whether or not certain races should be placed under
specific surveillance are met with simple relays of statistics of the form
“such and such class of people are responsible for a high percent of such
and such harm” or “This decision cannot be a bias incident, as it was based
off of such and such statistic”. This use of statistics is difficult to meet,
as it seems that statistical information is a near inarguable empirical fact.
However, hidden behind the spouting of these statistics is a dangerous
assumption that deference to a statistic is inherently unproblematic, an
assumption that I will go on to challenge later.
So, what exactly is the role of statistics in justifying institutional ac-
tions? In what cases is deferring to a statistic appropriate, and when does
it constitute an abuse? I will begin our investigation by looking into some
established legal philosophy for some insights.
Chapter 2
Statistics and Liability
Consider the following hypothetical.
A horrible bus accident has occurred, and the Blue Bus Com-
pany is being sued by the victim. This accident occurs in two
worlds exactly alike except:
In the first world, the victim reports that the bus she was hit
by had the Blue Bus Company logo. The court knows that eye-
witness accounts are fallible, and that they are accurate only
about 70% of the time.
In the second world, the victim never sees the bus that they
were hit by, but it is known that 70% of the buses in the city are
from the Blue Bus Company.
Is the eye-witness evidence presented in the first world just as
good as the statistical evidence presented in the second?
Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher provide an account of statistical evidence
that identifies two properties that eyewitness evidence has that statistical
14
CHAPTER 2. STATISTICS AND LIABILITY 15
methods do not have.7 The first is that eyewitness evidence is sensitive to
counterfactuals, and the second is that eyewitness evidence creates an in-
centive system that discourages the breaking of laws. I address sensitivity
first.
2.1 Sensitivity
Measuring something generally requires an instrument that is sensitive to
whatever it is being measured. For instance, a thermometer is sensitive to
temperature because it changes in accordance with the temperature. When
I see a thermometer that reads 30 degrees Celsius, I know that if it was not
30 degrees Celsius then the thermometer would not read 30 degrees Cel-
sius, and I know that if the thermometer did not read 30 degrees Celsius,
then it is not 30 degrees Celsius. We can test if an instrument is sensitive
to an outcome x by checking these two statements.
• If the instrument reads x, then it is x.
• If the instrument does not read x, then it is not x.
For our thermometer, this would mean:
• If the thermometer reads 30◦C, then it is 30◦C.
• If the thermometer does not read 30◦C, then it is not 30◦C.
7David Enoch, Levi Spectre, and Talia Fisher, “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the
Legal Value of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012)
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We can construct an analogous pair of statements when considering ev-
idence. We might say something like “In order to use a piece of evidence
to determine the guilt of some party, the piece of evidence must be sensi-
tive to whether or not the party is guilty.” In this case, the instrument is
the eye-witness account, and the target measurement is the bus company
responsible for the accident. However, we cannot directly port over our
original two statements, as it is not true that If an eye-witness makes a tes-
timony that the blue bus company is responsible, then it is the case that the
blue bus company is responsible. As our eye-witness is very fallible, we
need a weaker condition that keeps the separation. We can instead focus
on whether the quality of the evidence changes when considering a coun-
terfactual. For instance, in the eye-witness case, we can ask if it would be
likely for the eye-witness account to change if the blue bus company did
not cause the accident. Here, the answer seems to be yes. If the blue bus
company did not cause the accident, then the eye-witness would probably
not testify that they did. However, in the case of statistical evidence, if
the blue bus company did not cause the accident, the evidence would not
change. It would still be true that the Blue Bus Company owns 70% of the
busses in the city. And so, because this statistical evidence is not sensitive
to counterfactuals, we have reason to prefer the eye-witness evidence over
statistical evidence, even though they are both equally fallible.
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2.2 Incentives
Related to Enoch et al.’s concerns about sensitivity is their incentives ac-
count. To illustrate this account, consider the following thought experi-
ment proposed by Enoch et al.
Someone named Alice thinking about scalping tickets to a show.
She is standing outside of the gates, wondering if she should
begin selling her tickets for profit. She looks around, and ob-
serves that 80% of the people around her are scalping tickets.
Like our Blue Bus case there are two possible worlds, one in
which the legal system uses eyewitness evidence, and one in
which the legal system uses statistical evidence.
In the first world, where the legal system uses eyewitness evi-
dence, Alice has an incentive to not scalp the tickets, as if she
does, someone may see her and provide eyewitness evidence,
and if she does not, there will be no eyewitness to see her scalp-
ing tickets. In the second case, where the legal system relies on
statistical methods, Alice has no incentive to not scalp tickets,
as the court will conclude that she is 80% likely to be scalp-
ing tickets, from observing the proportion of caught scalpers
to non-scalpers. So statistical evidence should be viewed with
caution as it does not provide an incentive system that discour-
ages breaking the law. 8
Setting aside the concern that the functions of law may or may not in-
clude proper incentive systems, this account seems satisfactory in small
cases like ticket scalping, but in larger cases, such as accusations of terror-
ism, these legal incentive systems appear to be very weak. For example,
8Ibid.
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we can imagine that a person about to board a bus would not be inspired
to bomb the bus by the sheer fact that they would be accused for it anyway
under a legal system that uses statistical methods. It should be noted that
many contentious statistical methods in law, like racial profiling, are in use
in the hopes to catch extreme crimes. For cases like this, it seems the in-
centive account is incomplete, and we need something a little stronger to
justify ignoring or accepting statistical methods in our legal proceedings.
Enoch’s diagnosis of the ticket scalping example works because the
scalping of tickets is a wrong of exploitation for personal gain. The crim-
inal in this case has a clear benefit in doing the crime and need only to
check whether or not they would be caught. Crimes of exploitation, or in-
tentional harm, need laws that are sensitive to the particulars for the exact
reason that Enoch provides. Without sensitivity, there is no incentive to
avoid doing the crime. But we might go further and say that the lack of
this incentive system justifies the crime should it happen. Consider the IRS
taking a look at tax forms, and suppose that it is known that the majority
of people overstate their charitable contributions by about $500. The IRS
then decides to deduct $500 from all statements of charitable donations.
The worry here is not that the IRS will be less accurate, but instead that
the IRS has now:
1. Justified the tax payers who overstate their contributions
2. Punished those that do not overstate their contributions
This issue still stands should we consider a probabalistic case. Suppose
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we determine that 70% of the population overstate their charitable con-
tributions. Any way we split the cost, the moment the IRS declares a flat
deduction to compensate for this overstatement, overstating by that much
becomes justified, and the strategic course of action.
2.3 Statistical Confidence
Schmalbeck gives us a separate account of why statistical evidence might
leave us uncomfortable.9 Can we explain our discomfort by appealing to
statistical confidence? We can imagine a potato inspector looking over a
shipment of 1,000 potatoes. If the passing standard is that no more than 5%
of the potatoes are too small, and our inspector opens a box of 50 potatoes
and finds 4 potatoes are too small, the best the inspector can do is infer that
8% of the potatoes in the shipment are defective. While the judgement is
justified, we must attend to how confident we are that our inference is a
good estimation of the actual distribution of small potatoes. In this case
we could just take a larger sample, but for our blue bus company, sample
size cannot be an issue, as we are given that we know what company all
the busses in the city belong to. However, we can still pin some of the
blame on a shaky level of confidence we have in our statistic. Instead of
separating out distributing liability using the share of busses or share of
prior crimes, factors such as the distribution of busses and share of prior
9Richard Schmalbeck, “The Trouble with Statistical Evidence,” Law & Contemporary
Problems 49 (1986)
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crimes can just be said to increase our level of confidence in our statistic.
If we can explain our discomfort with using statistics in law by our lack
of attention to confidence, we should investigate whether or not we can
identify some confidence level that would ease our worries.
While it seems true that Statistical Confidence is a relevant concern
with statistical evidence, Enoch et al.’s concerns and Schmalbeck’s con-
cerns seem to be of different kinds. Issues of Sensitivity and Incentives ap-
pear robust even when we assume maximum statistical confidence. Just
as before, it seems like Schmalbeck’s concern of statistical confidence lies
in a practical concern that can simply be fixed using more accurate mea-
surement methods. It does not point to a concern that is inherent in the
idea of applying a statistical test.
We have already reviewed the Enoch et al. account and Schmalbeck’s
account of why we should prefer eye-witness evidence, but we are now
interested in whether or not statistical evidence can be used as part of the
sentencing process. While it seems like we have reason to be very sus-
picious about the use of statistical evidence, there are more moderate an-
swers we can consider. So far, we have attended to accounts of statistical
evidence that consider its influence on who should be charged, but in the
following sections, we will see a use for statistical evidence used directly
in the sentencing process.
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2.4 Market Share Liability
One way to use statistics to resolve the bus problem is to outline a sort
of distributed liability that holds the blue bus company responsible only
for a portion of the claimed damages. A legal doctrine already exists for
portioning out liability, but this doctrine currently only covers product
liability.
The doctrine we are interested in extending is the doctrine of Market
Share Liability, established by Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. In Sindell, a
woman who developed a cancer related to a drug her mother took while
she was pregnant sued eleven drug companies on behalf her herself and
other women in similar situations. The drug, DES, was marketed to preg-
nant women to help avoid miscarriages. When it was found to be linked
with cancer in children, the FDA ordered that the drug be labelled as ex-
perimental, with additional warnings for pregnant women. The defen-
dants continued to advertise the drug without restriction, against the or-
ders of the FDA.10
The notable portion of the case was a cause of action that stated the
defendants were jointly liable regardless of which of the defendants man-
ufactured the brand of DES that the plaintiff’s mother consumed. Due to
joint marketing campaigns and pharmaceutical practices at the time, the
specific brand that was consumed could not be identified, and so any joint
10Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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liability that would be established could not depend on knowledge of the
actual manufacturer.
In the end, the defendants were held responsible for the damages in
proportion to the market share they held on DES. The suggested require-
ments for this kind of liability was as follows:
1. There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to
the manufacture of the product.
2. Plaintiff is not at fault for the absence of evidence identifying the
causative agent but, rather, this absence of proof is due to defen-
dant’s conduct.
3. A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the
defendants.
4. Plaintiff’s injury was caused by this defect.
5. Defendants owed a duty to the class of which the plaintiff was a
member.
6. There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff’s injury was
caused by a product made by one of the defendants. For example,
the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such defec-
tive products on the market at the time of plaintiff’s injury.
7. All defendants were tortfeasors11 12
That fifth condition, the defendants owing a duty to the class of which
the plaintiff was a member, will be the condition of interest later in our
11Ibid.
12A tortfeasor is one who commits a tort. A tort is a civil wrong
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generalization of Market Share Liability, as many of the the other condi-
tions are specific to a product defect.
There are some difficulties with this kind of distributed liability. With
the establishment of any new legal doctrine, we must be careful to con-
sider possible avenues for exploitation. It is immediately clear that a strong
method of determining the “market” for other kinds of statistical evidence
is critical. As an example, for our bus case, we observe that the blue bus
company owns 80% of the busses in the city, but owns only 40% of the
busses that have routes running through the site of the accident. If we have
a competing bus company, the red bus company that owns all other busses
in the city, then the blue bus company is motivated to present the more
constrained statistic, and the red bus company is motivated to present the
broader statistic. If we allow for each defendant to select the statistic that
presents them with the smallest share of liability, we would be judging
each defendant with different standards, and would be unable to recover
a significant portion of the damages. In this instance we would only be
able to recover 60% of the damages, 40% from the blue bus company, pre-
senting the more constrained statistic, and 20% from the red bus company,
presenting the broader statistic. In the interest of fair judgement and to
make it possible to recoup a significant share of the claimed damages, we
must add an additional condition that sample in the statistics used must
be the same.
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2.5 Problems With the FDA
There are some practical blockages to any account of distributed liability.
For instance, in Sindell, the FDA acted appropriately by judging that DES
be labelled as experimental, and it is clear that the defendants in the case
were at the very least guilty of ignoring the commands of the FDA. Be-
cause the FDA acted appropriately, it seems easy to limit the liability to
the companies that did not follow the FDA guidelines. However, suppose
we have a case where the FDA acts appropriately, the drug companies act
appropriately, but damages are still incurred. Our example for this case
will be the Reye’s Syndrome link with Aspirin.
Aspirin, being one of the most commonly used medications in the
world, was considered well understood, and relatively safe. However, in
the 1980’s a series of epidemiological studies demonstrated a link between
children taking Aspirin for specific illnesses, and Reye’s Syndrome, an of-
ten fatal kind of swelling of the brain. The FDA acted quickly to demand
warnings, and drug companies complied. Although the FDA worked as
it should, and the drug companies did indeed follow orders, who, if any-
body, should be held responsible for the damages associated with having
a child afflicted with Reye’s Syndrome?
Two practical barriers affect our notion of distributed liability. The first
is Sovereign Immunity, which states that the government and governing
entities cannot be sued unless the federal government waives its immu-
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nity. The Federal Tort Claims Act13 gives private parties the right to sue
the United States if a tort is committed by a person acting on behalf of the
government, but the Act has, written within it, a clause preventing law-
suits against the FDA that implicate the drug approval process. So, even
if a case could be made that an employee at the FDA committed a tort
while acting on behalf of the government by approving a defective drug,
the FDA is immune from all such lawsuits.
The second barrier is Wyeth v. Levine, which judged that FDA clear-
ance of a medication does not protect against liability claims under state
labelling laws.14 This stops us from trying to move liability up the chain
to the drug approval system, as a drug passing federal clearance does not
grant the drug company freedom from liability.
There seems to be a practical problem of what to do with the missing
liability if we find that the FDA or some other legal entity with protected
status is partially at fault for whatever harm we are examining. While
these considerations might stop us from insisting that our account of ap-
propriate uses of statistics be integrated directly into the legal system, we
can, and will later in the paper, argue that there is still a responsibility to
transparency and verifiability.
13Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Pt.VI Ch.171 (1946).
14Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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2.6 Sindell and the Bus Company
Our comfort with claiming that the blue bus company was an analogous
case to the Sindell case without false advertising is that we noted that
passing FDA regulations does not grant legal protection from litigation,
as drug companies are still responsible for determining the effects of the
drugs that they produce. However, this move was too quick, as although
the bus companies are all still responsible to drive safely, they do not have
a responsibility to demonstrate that their driving did not cause a specific
accident. To illustrate this difference, we can examine several adjustments
of the Sindell Case. A variant where none of the companies falsely adver-
tised their product, and a variant where there was no error in production
or testing the medicine.
Our original Sindell case seems to be a clear cut case where distributed
liability is a good option. The fact that all of the defendants are known
to have committed false advertising and did not follow FDA guidelines
seems like a strong enough reason to say that the defendants are all re-
sponsible for some portion of the damages. However, the main consider-
ation when thinking about justified distributive liability is not whether or
not all defendants are tortfeasors or if they knew their product could cause
harm, but whether or not the company is responsible for collecting evidence
that would demonstrate that they could not have contributed to the harm.
After we know that one of the defendants caused a harm, that harm
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is causally linked with some action or inaction that the defendant has a
responsibility to keep to track of. Then, if any of the defendants can pro-
duce the required records that show that they were not responsible for that
harm, they are ejected from the liability pool. The remaining defendants
that are unable to produce the relevant records are subject to distributed
liability. In the case where all defendants produce the required records
and pass, the court was incorrect in their evaluation that the harm was
caused by that action or inaction. The court must then review the cause
of the damage, and the pool of defendants cannot be litigated against. For
instance, in the variant of the Sindell case where the defendants do not
falsely advertise and do not know if the drugs they produced were the
harmful drug, we are still justified in including potential non-producers
of the harmful drug in the pool of defendants because drug companies
should have records of what kinds of drugs they produced.
Here, the defendants have a responsibility to provide evidence that is
available for public review.
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To be a true parallel to our bus case, we should have a pool of defen-
dants that are being included in the pool of defendants due to some feature
they share that they do not have a responsibility to track. For instance, we
can imagine that Sindell, instead of being able to identify the drug, instead
remembers that she purchased it on the third shelf of some convenience
store, and so is suing all drug companies that happened to have drugs on
that shelf. We see here that it seems unreasonable for drug companies to
keep track of what shelf their medication is in, and furthermore, their in-
volvement in this case seems purely predicated on the shelving practices
of the convenience store. We might still have an intuition that these drug
companies should still be included in the pool. We can imagine a harsher
case. Imagine that Sindell had suffered medical complications from con-
suming food from a farmer’s market. Sindell can only identify that she
purchased the food at a time between 3-4 pm, and she is suing all indi-
viduals that sold food in between those times. Defendants are no longer
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drug companies but Grandma Jones, who sold her spinach that she grew
in her backyard, Fred, an unassuming businessman with a hobby for hor-
ticulture, and Rachel, a young college student selling decorative cacti to
help with her student debt. Are we willing to saddle these people with
the responsibility of paying for Sindell’s bills?
The answer hinges on whether or not the court decides that Grandma
Jones, Fred, and Rachel are responsible for testing their food for harmful
pathogens, which in this case seems unreasonable, as they do not pose as
large a threat to public health i comparison to a restaurant, and they do not
undergo the regular health and safety checks required by local law. Below,
we present a case that illustrates what we demand.
2.7 Restaurants and Dinner Parties
Suppose Alice and Bob are each very hungry and decide to eat diner at
three different places. Alice chooses to three different restaurants called
restaurant 1, restaurant 2, and restaurant 3. Bob chooses to attend three
different dinner parties hosted by friends, called party 1, party 2, and party
3. Alice and Bob, after their night of eating three dinners, comes down
with a terrible food borne illness, and are looking to litigate against the
restaurants and the hosts of the dinner parties respectively. Neither Alice
nor Bob can pinpoint which restaurant or party caused the illness, and so
they attempt to take all of them to court. The court determines that the
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cause of Alice and Bob’s illness is a pathogen that is active when meat is
not kept at the proper temperature.
In the case of Alice, it is known that restaurants are required to keep
daily records of their refrigerator temperatures, a health and safety re-
quirement in some states, and so the court orders these records from the
restaurants. Suppose restaurant 1 produces the records, which state that
proper fridge temperatures were maintained, but restaurants 2 and 3 could
not produce the required records. Then restaurant 1 is removed from the
pool of defendants, and restaurants 2 and 3 are subject to distributed lia-
bility. Each of restaurants 2 and 3 are responsible for 50% of the damages
that Alice is claiming, even if we have no idea which restaurant is the true
source of the pathogen.
In the case of Bob, it is not at all required for dinner party hosts to keep
records of their fridge temperatures, and so Bob cannot litigate against his
hosts. The case is dropped and none of the hosts are held responsible be-
cause Bob cannot identify which of them are responsible, and its unreason-
able to require that the defendants have evidence that would determine
their eligibility to b e included in the pool of defendants. It is unreasonable
to require dinner party hosts to keep regular temperature records because
dinner party hosts hold significantly less capacity to harm the public. In-
dividual dinner party hosts do not hold the kind of institutional power an
established public restaurant would.
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2.8 Distributable Forms of Punishment
It appears that only certain kinds of sentences can be dealt with by dis-
tributive liability. Going back to our shotgun case, if Alice and Bob both
shot a shotgun shell with 50 pellets at Carl, and Carl died from a single
bullet, it seems inappropriate to argue that Alice and Bob should evenly
split the sentence. Taken to the extreme, all one would need to do to effec-
tively get away with murder is to invite as many friends over as possible,
hand all of them shotguns, fire at Carl, and then enjoy 1
n
th of the share
of the punishment, where n is the number of friends you invite. From
this, we might suspect that only financial liability is divisible, or that the
distinction lies in the civil/criminal distinction.
However, we can refine the method of distributing liability so that we
do not need to appeal to either financial liability, or the civil/criminal dis-
tinction. A more nuanced approach to the shotgun case is to claim that we
should subtract the sentencing for a successful murder from an attempted
murder, and then distribute that figure among the shotgun wielders. This
method seems to handle non-financial sentences more appropriately than
the blind split. Additionally, if we grant that we can distribute liability in
this criminal murder case, and in the civil Sindell case, we cannot appeal to
the civil/criminal distinction to decide when distributed liability is appro-
priate. We are justified here in dividing up the sentencing because there is
no question that everyone is guilty of attempted murder. What is to be de-
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termined is how the statistic informs who fired the fatal shot. Imagine for
instance that the sentence for attempted murder is 20 years, but the sen-
tence for a successful murder is 26 years, and Alice and Bob are the only
shotgun wielders with an equal number of pellets fired from each gun. It
does not seem implausible that the proper response is say that Alice and
Bob should both get 23 years. However, this runs counter to our restau-
rant/dinner party distinction! The shotgun case places Alice and Bob in
a dinner party case, as we do not expect that Alice or Bob should collect
statistics on where their pellets went after they fired. If we are to simply
extend our earlier proposal, then using distributed liability is unjustified,
and Alice and Bob should not split the additional six years. However, the
function of the restaurant/dinner party distinction is to clear up the fuzzi-
ness of proposing a cause, and then seeing who is potentially responsible
for the proposed cause. Then in the shotgun case, there is no mystery of
the cause of the crime, and so Alice and Bob already volunteer themselves
to distributed liability when they took aim with their shotguns.
2.9 Our Account
Here, we are ready to present a full account of the generalization of Market
Share liability:
1. First, we have a defendant who is claiming action against a group of
defendants, from which the defendant cannot identify who specifi-
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cally committed the tort.
2. Then, the court decides on some cause of the damage.
3. The court then investigates whether or not the defendants have a
responsibility to keep records of actions that would demonstrate that
they were not the cause.
4. If such a responsibility exists, all the defendants that could not pro-
duce the expected records or fail to have the records demonstrate
freedom from liability can be subject to market share liability. If no
such responsibility exists, then distributive liability is unjustified.
With this method, we can solve our case of the Blue Bus Company by
considering the cause of damage.
One outcome might have the court decide that the cause of the harm
was a mechanical failure of the bus. The court discovers that all bus com-
panies must submit daily inspections on their vehicles and asks the group
of defendants, which includes the Blue Bus Company, to produce the re-
ports. If the Blue Bus Company can produce the report, and the report
states that all their buses were in good working order, then the Blue Bus
Company is ejected from the pool of defendants and is not responsible
for any damages. If they fail to produce the reports, or the reports show
that some of the buses had the specified mechanical failure, the Blue Bus
Company cannot prove that they could not have been responsible, and so
distributed liability is applied.
CHAPTER 2. STATISTICS AND LIABILITY 34
Another outcome might have the court decide that the cause of the
harm was an inattentive driver. After investigation, the court finds that
bus companies are not required to subject their employees to the kind of
supervision that detects attentiveness, so the case is dropped and the Blue
Bus Company pays nothing. Another option is to have distributed lia-
bility as an option only when the defendants have been operating under
some regulatory body that dictate exactly what must be tracked. What this
regulatory body finds is reasonable to demand is left up to the regulatory
body. Just as we have health and safety regulations, we can propose sta-
tistical analysis regulations. I will discuss this kind of regulation in more
detail in the next chapter.
2.10 Self-incrimination
An immediate objection to the restaurant and dinner party distinction is
that in the restaurant case, it seems like the restaurant is being required
to self-incriminate, or put themselves in danger of persecution. However,
we can simply move when we check the records for conformity to an al-
ready established practice of health and safety inspections, and records
that are already relayed to regulatory bodies. There is an open question
on whether self-incrimination extends to institutional policies, but just as
it has become popular to demand that police wear body cameras, it might
be reasonable to institute a practice of requiring each refrigerator in restau-
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rants to contain a record-keeping thermometer. When the health inspector
comes along, just as they would ensure that every fire extinguisher is in
place and being checked daily for pressure, they would also ensure that
the appropriate thermometer is in place and being recorded.
What we have done here is identify some additional criterion that is
required when attempting to use statistical evidence to justify an institu-
tional action in reference to a regulatory principle. In the restaurant and
dinner party case, we say that in order for us to use market share in order
to justify distributed sentencing, the defendants must have a responsibil-
ity, or duty, to the plaintiff to provide the relevant statistic. In the restau-
rant case, it was refrigerator temperatures, and in the bus case, it might be
mechanical checks, or anything else that we might judge a bus company
responsible for.
2.11 Limits of Marketshare Liability
We may be comfortable with making judgements using marketshare lia-
bility on companies, but making judgements on individuals seems intu-
itively more difficult.
Dr. Thomson, in her paper Liability and Individualized Evidence, pro-
poses another related thought experiment. Suppose Alice and Bob both
do not like Carl, and both shoot Carl with a shotgun at the same time. Carl
is killed due to the action of a single pellet, and we are unable to determine
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whose shotgun fired the pellet. After some investigation, it is discovered
that Alice’s shotgun fired a shell with 95 pellets, and Bob’s shotgun fired
a shell with only 5. They are both clearly guilty of attempted murder, but
who is guilty of murder?15
Our distinction between restaurants and dinner parties doesn’t seem
to apply here, as neither the defendants nor the victim are institutions
that might carry a responsibility to track a specific statistic. If we are to
claim that distributing the sentencing based on the probability that one of
their bullets was the lethal bullet, we must justify that use of statistics with
something other than the process I have described here.
to make things more difficult, we can consider scenarios in which there
is no institution that has done wrong, and it is not the case that all accused
are guilty of even an attempt at harm. For instance, consider the case
where ten people are in a bus, and someone drops a ball filled with toxic
gas. The ball rolls about the bus and bursts open, and all ten people need
expensive medical attention. We know that one of the ten persons on the
bus is responsible, but we wouldn’t claim that each person is responsible
for 10% of the damages.
But in this paper I am not too concerned with the application of statis-
tics to individuals. The useful tool that comes out of the discussion of
Marketshare Liability is actually the restaurant and dinner party distinc-
15Judith Thomson, “Liability and Individualized Evidence,” Law & Contemporary Prob-
lems 49 (1986)
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tion, which shifts responsibility for recording and producing statistics onto
institutions.
Chapter 3
Statistics as Justification
I will move away from discussing distributed liability for a moment while
we attend to the CVS case introduced the introduction. While I briefly
mentioned some intuitions about the CVS case that pointed to some dis-
comfort in the Introduction, here, I will outline the specific problems that
come with trying to use statistics as a justification for institutional actions.
The end goal is to make it very difficult for an institution to abuse statis-
tics to deflect blame for things like racial bias, and provide a system where
the public can be confident that institutions are being honest about their
policies that they claim are being motivated purely by statistical analysis.
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3.1 The Masking Problem
Statistics, because of their perceived status as objective and factful, are
easy tools to divert suspicions. To help illustrate the potential harm in
using statistics to justify actions, I will offer some variations on the CVS
case presented in the introduction, copied here for convenience.
In 2006, CVS fell under investigation when customers noticed
that in a selection of CVS locations, only hair products mar-
keted towards black women had an attached security tag. When
accused of racism, CVS responded that they merely make a
practice of affixing security tags to products stolen most often.
The most obvious worry is whether or not CVS was being truthful
about its tracking. It seems plausible that in order to cover up the racially
motivated actions done by a few managers, CVS just cited a database that
did not exist. As CVS never released the data that would tell them which
items were most often stolen, we are forced to just trust them that the data
exists, and was indeed the reason behind the security taggings. Here, the
citing of the statistic just helps mask racial motivations.
The problem is not dissolved if we suppose that the database exists
and is accurate. We can imagine an adjustment to the CVS case where
managers of individual locations are given a choice as to whether or not
to use the database to tag products. A racist manager could easily base
their decision on which protocol disadvantages a race more. For instance,
when selecting which protocol to use when tagging products, say a pro-
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tocol where random items are tagged and a protocol where the database
is used, a manager might first check whether or not either protocol disad-
vantages black customers and base their decision on that determination.
When accused of racism, the manager denies that they chose the protocol
based on race and instead says that they were purely motivated by try-
ing to keep the theft of objects at a minimum. Under this system, once
again, the deployment of the statistic serves to mask racially charged mo-
tivations.
I will use the term masking to refer to cases where an institutions policy
that is justified through deference to a statistic has the effect of excusing
actions that are born our of other motivations.
With these adjustments, we can see that claiming deference to a statis-
tic, even if the statistic is accurately sourced and correctly interpreted, is
not enough to justify actions. However, the core problem still seems to
rely on some individual having a racist attitude. Can an institution abuse
a statistic even when none of its constituents hold a specific objectionable
attitude?
3.2 Bias in Institutions
Attending to bias in institutions has already had attention from our legal
systems. In 1961, President Kennedy signed an executive order that re-
quired government contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that
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applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employ-
ment without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”16 A few
years later, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) was
formed, which attended to cases of workplace discrimination for some
protected classes. Of course, as one might expect, these legal measures
to stem discriminatory practices ran into some immediate practical prob-
lems.
The immediate problem recognized was that mentioned in the previ-
ous section. What is required to determine an institution guilty of dis-
crimination? If we require that there must be an attitude held by some
employee, it seems like there is no need to attend to purely institutional
cases of discrimination. A suit can be filed against the specific individual
accused of holding this attitude, and the repercussions for the institutions
would fall out of attempting to undo whatever policies have been imple-
mented by that specific person.
While masking has already been recognized by a few philosophers,
the prevailing common view seems to be that wrongs of bias reduce to
attitudes of specific individuals. In Judge, Jury, and Executioner, the Un-
accountable Algorithm, Frank Pasquale points out that states have already
passed laws aimed to restrict masking in other cases.
Consider a variable that seems, on its face, less charged: months
since last job. Such data could aid employers who favour work-
16Exec. Order. No. 10925, 26 FR 1977 (March 8, 1961),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1961-kennedy.html.
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ers quickly moving from job to job — or discriminate against
those who needed time off to recover from an illness. Wor-
ried about the potentially unfair impact of such considerations,
some jurisdictions have forbidden employers from posting “help
wanted” ads telling the unemployed not to apply. That is a
commendable policy step — but whatever its merits, what teeth
will it have if employers never see CVs excluded by an algo-
rithm that blackballs those whose latest entry is more than a
few months old? Big data can easily turn into a sophisticated
tool for deepening already prevalent forms of unfair disadvan-
tage.17
We can recognize similar problems with other variables in other sys-
tems. Hiring procedures that take a look at zip codes, scholarship funds,
and financial background raise worries that they are essentially construct-
ing a race test using metrics that correlate closely with race. The Chinese
Social Credit System had proposals to track online purchases, which might
seem innocent until we consider what might happen if purchasing sup-
plies for infants or purchasing large amounts of imported goods might
be used to discriminate against pregnant women or foreign born citizens.
While any one of these inputs might seem to loosely correlated for a good
statistical test, a large scale algorithm operating in “big data” may be the
perfect masking mechanism for protected classes.
At the very least, institutions can be accused of being structured in such
a way that makes it very easy to hide discriminatory procedures. If we are
17Frank Pasquale. “Judge, Jury and Executioner: the unaccountable algorithm,” Aeon,
August 18, 2015
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to take seriously our legislation designed to minimize discrimination, we
must be careful about our attitude towards statistical justification. The use
of statistics cannot be seen as a thing of convenience, nor can the deference
to a statistic be the end of a conversation about discrimination. Large insti-
tutions under regulations for discrimination should be designed to have
the fewest possible avenues of exploitation, which suggest that we need
additional criterion for appropriate uses of statistics.
3.3 Habituation and Normalization
In the following three sections, I will give some wrongs in using statisti-
cal evidence that surface without any objectionable attitude held by any
constituent of an institution.
A problem arises when the reason for institutional policies is hidden.
We can imagine an adjustment of the CVS case where no employee in CVS
is racist, and all the store managers choose to use the database of stolen
items purely to reduce the number of stolen items. With this presumption,
any problem of expressing bias cannot be reduced to the bias of individ-
uals, as no individual in CVS has an objectionable bias. When customers
enter the store, they notice that the products that are tagged are marketed
towards black people. Just having a policy that tags products in this way
opens up avenues for habituation and normalization.
Habituation is the process by which an agent decreases or increases
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICS AS JUSTIFICATION 44
a response to a stimulus through repeated applications of that stimulus.
Normalization occurs when previously unacceptable behaviors become
commonly accepted.
In our hypothetical CVS case, we can imagine that after this policy is
implemented, customers are initially shocked and demand answers. The
managers reply that their store tags in this way in accordance with a loss
prevention database, which does not consider any racial marketing that a
product has. The customer then goes on their way, and in every CVS store
they walk into, they notice that the products are tagged in this fashion, and
remember that CVS has this database. What will happen when these cus-
tomers encounter incidents of explicit racism? Eventually, seeing products
marketed towards black people selectively tagged will not prompt these
habituated customers to seek explanations, or they will assume that the
explanation is that the store has a similar database, even when they don’t.
Widespread use of this policy desensitizes the population to responding
to signs of bias, thereby assisting in masking racism in institutions that do
contain individuals that hold objectionable attitudes.
With Habituation, comes worries of Normalization. As people respond
less and less to these practices, over time, the behavior can become the
new norm, even without the original justification. We can imagine an-
other shop owner, too small to maintain their own database, simply copy-
ing CVS practices as they too want to reduce the number of thefts in their
store. With customers being habituated out of responding to apparently
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racist practices, we risk masking the explicit bias of other institutions, and
normalizing the behavior into acceptable without reference to the statistic
that bore the behavior in the first place. There are a selection of practical
reasons to worry over these normalized behaviors. First, separating the
statistic from the behavior makes it impossible to check whether or not a
manager is explicitly racist, or is copying the now normal behavior of an
institution like CVS. Second, it provides traction for existing prejudices.
It is already popular for far-right nationalists to recruit new members by
spouting statistics on race, and normalizing this behavior might make this
transition much easier. Third, separating the behavior from the statistic
renders the behavior insensitive to change. We might expect CVS’s in dif-
ferent locations to have different products that are most often stolen, or
businesses of different kinds to have different rates of theft. In addition,
these statistics may change over time, rendering the normalized behavior
obsolete, and the store owner no method of checking whether or not the
policy is actually serving its intended purpose.
These problems, habituating and normalizing actions, masking racist
institutions, and justifying the rhetoric of racist institutions, occur without
any intention on the part of the institution that implements this policy.
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3.4 Other Accounts of Racism
There are other accounts of Racism that can also be applied independent
of any individual holding racist attitudes.
• The Responsibility Account maintains that racial profiling against races
that face background injustice is more problematic if the higher of-
fender rate in the profiled group is caused by social injustices for
which other groups are responsible.
• The Expressive Harm Account maintains that racial profiling is prob-
lematic because it makes background injustice vivid and thereby causes
the profiled to feel resentment.
• The Humiliation Account maintains that racial profiling is problem-
atic as it places individuals in a situation where they cannot prevent
appearing to onlookers in a demeaning way.18
These accounts do well in describing the harms of racial profiling, but
do not generalize well to cases beyond racism. I aim to give an account of
why using statistics as a justification in general can be problematic without
specific criterion. Specific classes of statistics as justification, like racial
profiling, can have additional reasons why they might be objectionable,
but our account will hit more than protected classes such as race.
We can imagine, for instance, some warehouse company that does not
want to spend extra money purchasing step ladders, and so they try to
avoid hiring short people. The responsibility and expressive harm based
18Bou-Habib, Paul. ”Racial Profiling and Background Injustice.” The Journal of Ethics
15, no. 1/2 (2011): 33-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41486899.
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account fails because there is (arguably) no background injustice for short
people. The humiliation account seems to fail if all hiring is done in pri-
vate, and the company never divulges the reason why applicants are not
hired. There still seems to be something wrong with this kind of hiring,
and so we should look for accounts of policy making that stop such abuses
even without the context of background injustice or matters of appear-
ances.
3.5 What Must be Done
Before I show the criterion for statistical justification, I will generalize the
CVS case. Any time some institution institutes a policy that is suspected
to be born from some bias, and the institution justifies the policy by refer-
encing some statistic, the previously outlined problems are imminent. In
order to properly avoid these issues, we must look back at our restaurant
and dinner party distinction mentioned earlier.
To review, we imagine Alice has come down with a terrible case of
some food-borne illness that is caused by improperly refrigerated foods,
and we know that one of three restaurants is potentially responsible. Alice
accuses all three. As the restaurants are required to record daily refrigera-
tor temperatures to submit to a health and safety regulatory body, we can
check if any of the restaurants had refrigerators that were not up to stan-
dard. If any of the three restaurants show that they indeed had the proper
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refrigerator temperature, they are free to go, but whichever restaurants fail
to provide the records or fail to meet standards, we are justified in using a
form of distributed liability amongst them.
The reason why distributed liability is appropriate in this setting is be-
cause it has been determined that in contrast to a dinner party, a restaurant
requires certain licensing that demands compliance with some health and
safety guidelines. To fail to produce the required report is to open yourself
up to accusations of breaches in health and safety. These guidelines protect
the public by first establishing minimum criteria for operation, and then
providing the public means of compensation in the case of an oversight
by the institution. It also offers a measure of protection for the institu-
tion, providing a way for the restaurant to avoid being accused of health
violations through producing records to a third party regulatory body.
Our proposal for an institution that intends to use a statistical database
as justification for policy is to set up a similar kind of system where in-
stitutions that want to use the production of records as justification must
meet some criteria first. The two criteria are simply Transparency and Ver-
ifiability.
I will go into more detail with transparency and verifiability using the
CVS case here. These criterion form the basis of a new proposal of regula-
tory practices for institutions that wish to justify policy through statistical
analysis. A society that successfully handles the difficulties implicit in in-
stitutional uses of statistical analysis must keep these systems transparent
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and publicly verifiable. If CVS expects to use their database to justify pol-
icy, then they must:
1. Be transparent in what metric they are using. Before implementing
the policy, they must have some public announcement that they will
be tagging products based on which products are reported stolen the
most often.
2. Be verifiable in that the statistical database should either be public or
sent as a record to some third party regulatory body to ensure that
the enacted policy is actually in line with the stated policy.
For CVS, they would announce their new database system, and have
the database in use be public access. They should also require that their
CVS branches behave according to this broader policy in order to avoid
the selective manager case, where a manager selects whatever policy is
most detrimental to a certain class. The broad move here is to change how
institutions view the deployment of statistics as part of policy. No longer
should institutions see statistical information as convenient ways to de-
flect direct responsibility for their policies, they should instead treat the
use of statistics in this way as a responsibility. What CVS is trying to get
us to accept when they claim that their deference to their database freed
them from wrong doing, is that we should treat statistical reports like tem-
perature reports from a restaurant. Temperature reports from a restaurant,
when the restaurant is accused of not meeting safety standards, can pro-
vide evidence for their guilt or innocence. But in order for that report to
do that work, it must be produced and checked by a regulatory body. In
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addition, we demand that restaurants submit to regular health and safety
checks that ensure these protections are in place. We can demand similar
checks for institutions that wield large scale tools of statistical analysis.
3.6 Addressing the Problems
How do our two criteria address the concerns outlined in the beginning of
this section?
Consider the masking problem first. In the masking case, we were con-
cerned that the statistic cited by CVS were either constructed after the fact
as a public relations move to limit the damage that the story was doing
to their brand, or the policy based on the statistic functioned to help hide
genuinely racist managers by offering them a choice as to what policy they
prefer. As mentioned before, a manager might first check whether or not
either protocol disadvantages black customers and base their decision on
that determination. When accused of racism, the manager denies that they
chose the protocol based on race and instead says that they were purely
motivated by trying to keep the theft of objects at a minimum. With our
two criterion, we address both issues. By stipulating that the institution
publicly divulge exactly what they are using to inform their policy, and
having the database publicly available, CVS cannot construct the justifi-
cation after the fact, denying them the ability to hide behind statistical
deference if they did not genuinely have such a system set up. The sec-
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ond problem of masking genuinely racist managers is avoided by having
the policy be non-optional for managers of individual branches. Notably,
this does not solve the issue, but rather kicks the issue up the chain of
responsibility to whoever is deciding on the policy in the first place. In
the original CVS case, we were worried that any branch manager could
mask their racially motivated policy in addition to higher-ups in the CVS
chain. In this case, at the very least we have limited the potential masking
problem to just the people at CVS responsible for broad corporate policy.
This is in line with the idea that institutions should be designed whenever
possible to have the fewest possible avenues of exploitation.
Addressing concerns about statistics that are simple proxies for statis-
tics on protected classes is more difficult. Just as we have a regulatory
body responsible for setting the standards for operating restaurants, there
should be a regulatory body responsible for determining which statistics
are permissible for use as justifications. This is not as radical as it seems
considering that our legal system already does this. For instance, sev-
eral states prohibit employers from asking applicants how long it has been
from their last job, partly to avoid discrimination against applicants that
needed time off to recover from injuries. It is also commonly accepted
the employers should not ask about marital status or whether or not the
applicant intends to have children, again, partly to avoid discrimination
against pregnant applicants. By extending these already granted powers
to a more systematic regulatory body, we can attend to proxies on a case-
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by-case basis.
Habituation is harder to handle. It is partially addressed by having
the institution make a public announcement of what exactly is being mea-
sured. Recall in our section on Problems of Privacy and Implementation that
we considered the story of Eve and Franny.
Eve and Franny are living under China’s Sesame Credit. Eve is
very knowledgable about the ins and outs of the system, and
can explain in detail how the algorithm is generating the report,
and what the report should look like given a brief description
of the inputs. Franny on the other hand, knows very little about
the mechanics of how the Social Credit System works, and like
most other citizens, is only aware of very general rules that af-
fect her score. She knows for instance, that her scores tend to
rise when she pays back her debts on time, but there are fluc-
tuations in her score that she cannot explain.
By having the institution make a public announcement, we can pre-
empt the issue of habituation by giving the justification before the policy
is observed. In addition, like in our Eve and Franny case, the transparency
and verifiability criterion ensure that even if most of the population be-
comes habituated to this kind of tagging, we can have anyone act as a Eve
to the system and check if the company is being honest with policy. Ideally,
when we observe a potentially problematic policy, every customer could
check if the policy falls out of some kind of established system, or if it con-
stitutes a breach in anti-discrimination regulations. This may sound far
fetched, but we can envision this working as a kind of fact check system.
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It is not too hard to imagine habituating a population to check snopes.com
whenever they come across a suspicious news story. If institutional poli-
cies were up to the same standard, it should be similarly feasible to ha-
bituate the population to check whatever system the regulatory body has
in place to track an institutions policies based on statistics. Work would
be needed to make habituation work for us rather than work for passivity.
Habituating a population to actively investigate claims of statistical justi-
fication becomes possible with the transparency and verifiability criterion.
Our issues with normalizing behaviors can similarly be helped by our
criterion. The worry that other institutions will hop on to a normalized
behavior is avoided by having the system be verifiable for each institu-
tion, and by having a regulatory body. Just like in our restaurant case,
the health and safety department comes by periodically to check that all
the fire-extinguishers are in order and all the refrigerator temperatures are
being properly recorded, we should expect our regulatory body check in-
stitutions to see if they are collecting the appropriate statistics honestly
instead off copying them off of some larger institution. The issue of giving
credence to groups like far-right nationalists will be addressed later. The
last issue of normalization was concerned with insensitivity to changes in
the statistic, but again, with the regulatory body in place, checking honest
data collection would be as expected as checking for honest food safety
measures.
Thinking broadly about the issue of sensitivity, this whole project can
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be seen as trying to establish conditions in which statistical evidence is
sensitive. Recall earlier, when we were discussing Enoch Et Al.’s work, the
fact that statistical evidence was insensitive to the particulars of the offense
was a major strike against its use. With our conditions and the regulatory
body in place, we can say that we have made the use of statistics somewhat
sensitive to the particulars. To illustrate the parallel:
1. Alice’s fingerprints on a gun, while being circumstantial evidence, is
still sensitive to the particulars of a murder case because we can say
if Alice did commit the crime, she would probably have her finger-
prints on the gun, and if she did not, she probably would not have
her fingerprints on the gun.
2. If we are in a discrimination case in our system, passing the checks
provided by our regulatory body is sensitive to the particulars of
the case because if the institution under examination was indeed be-
ing objectionably discriminatory it would be unlikely that the report
provided would match precisely with the actions of the policy, with
the mechanism of the policy being announced before its effect.
This system fits neatly under Enoch Et Al.’s as providing a method of
dealing with statistical evidence that makes them sensitive to the partic-
ulars make it much easier to justify using them as compelling pieces of
evidence in legal cases. No longer do we have the blue bus case where our
statistic seemed divorced from the incident we were investigating.
Our last problem, with other accounts of racism, actually ties in with
our previous worries about giving credence to groups like neo-nazi’s. While
our system can handle statistical justifications with background injustice
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fine, we have reason to pay special attention to socially pervasive forms
of discrimination, i.e. forms of discrimination with background injustice.
Two of the three presented accounts, the Responsibility Account and the
Expressive Harm Account deal directly with background injustice, and
we can use those, in conjunction with our system, to handle cases where
the deployment of statistics could lend credence to extreme groups. In
short, our system simply does not handle additional wrongs involving
background injustice, and so we need to import accounts of discrimina-
tion that do in order to point out abuses of statistics where one group preys
upon another group suffering from background injustice. In the section on
other accounts of racism, I did some work trying to separate the kind of
problem this system tackles and the kind of problem these other accounts
of racism tackle, and here their separation serves as an advantage, as these
other accounts apply where our system does not, and vice versa. Other
accounts can handle the specific injustices that come with discrimination
with a present background injustice, but my account can handle any claim
that an institution is not truly motivating their policy with their claimed
statistical analysis.
Chapter 4
Applications and Problems
In this chapter, we will take a closer look at what this system might look
like in practice, and discuss issues of feasibility and what still needs to be
developed.
4.1 The Regulatory Body
In the past few sections, it seems like I am relying heavily on a regula-
tory body analogous to health and safety organizations. I want to take a
moment here to explore what this regulatory body should do.
I will fall back to the familiar example of restaurants and their refrigera-
tor temperatures. Currently, restaurants are required to keep daily records
of their refrigerator and freezer temperatures, and during any health and
safety inspection, they must produce those records for review if asked.
56
CHAPTER 4. APPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS 57
Consider a refinement of this system. Instead of having to keep man-
ual records, restaurants are instead required to keep a thermometer in
each refrigerator, which records the temperature and sends it to the health
and safety department daily. If we are to seriously consider incorporating
more surveillance technology in our society, then this seems to be amongst
the least contentious applications. In effect, the regulatory body sets stan-
dards that must be held, and checks them through inspection. The func-
tion of the health inspector and the surveillance mechanism is similar, to
assist the regulatory body in determining if the institution is in line with
regulations.
Setting up a regulatory body to track the use of databases is structurally
similar to the health and safety case, but with some difficulties in deciding
how to implement inspections and interpret the “thermometers”. It seems
clear that a thermometer in a refrigerator is the most sensible way to deter-
mine if the refrigerator is up to standard, but how do we decide if a policy
and its associated database is up to standard? Let’s go through the CVS
case, paying attention to how the regulatory body will track policy.
CVS would like to use their database as justification for tagging prod-
ucts, and would like for their database to have protective force, i.e. they
would like their deference to this database to be recognized as the sole de-
terminer of policy regarding tagging procedures. In order for them to do
so, they would first approach the regulatory body with their database and
policy. To meet transparency, they would need to have available their pol-
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icy and the database to at least the regulatory body, and to meet verifiabil-
ity, the regulatory body must be able to, when asked, refer to the database
and compare the results to the distribution of security tags. Analogous to
the list of health and safety checks that a health and safety inspector might
go through, this regulatory body might send inspectors to randomly se-
lected CVS locations to help verify that the policy is properly in place.
We can question the feasibility of establishing a large regulatory body
for the use of databases, but the regulatory body would not be necessary
in most cases. CVS, instead of going through the regulatory body, might
meet transparency and verifiability by posting their database publicly, and
inviting anyone in any location to check that they are conforming to their
security policy. I would imagine that most would take this route. This is
fine, but the regulatory body has some other uses aside from ensuring our
two criterion.
First, having a regulatory body can better handle databases that con-
tain sensitive information. A company that wishes to establish policy on
the hiring process, or an institution that has some policy that depends on
where its members live, probably does not want to publish the relevant
database online. We can instead have the institutions differ to a regulatory
body. This step might appear to only push back the concern of privacy
to concerns about the security of the regulatory body, but given that these
demands only apply to institutions that attempt to implement policy, and
wish for their deference to a database defend them from certain kinds of
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accusations, some vulnerability will be necessary.
Second, a regulatory body that sets standards for permissible uses of
statistics allows us to have a sort of licensing procedure. Just as restau-
rants have a responsibility to the public that they must respect due to the
vulnerability of the public to their food safety practices, institutions that
create policies based on statistical evidence have a similar responsibility
to the public. In the first case, the public is vulnerable to health concerns,
and the government can intervene on their responsibility to public health
and safety. In the second case, the public is vulnerable to discrimination,
and the government can intervene on their responsibility to protect against
discriminatory practices, already recognized by bodies such as the EEOC
and acts such as the Civil Liberties Act of 1964. A restaurant needs licens-
ing because it deals in food preparation, which improperly handled, can
serve as a serious threat to public health, public health falling under the
governments jurisdiction. Institutions that enact policies in deference to
statistics needs licensing because it deals in the deployment of statistical
evidence, which improperly handled, can serve as a serious threat to anti-
discrimination laws, which fall under the governments jurisdiction.
4.2 Police Practices
We have taken a look at what I have constructed to be the easiest example
possible, the CVS security tag case. Now, I will try to apply this system to
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a much more contentious case, Police practices.
Let us take a look at racial profiling. Suppose a police institution is ac-
cused of racial discrimination in how it determines its patrol routes. The
police respond that they are merely patrolling in such a way that covers
neighborhoods that are more likely to have crimes committed in them.
Should we believe them, and in what cases must we accept that the po-
lice are indeed correct that their policy is actually pinned on the claimed
statistic?
First, they must have been transparent, by announcing that they were
planning on using this statistic before the policy was actually implemented
in order to avoid the case that the police found the statistic after the fact.
Second, they must also make the statistical evidence verifiable, possibly
by making it public. If they have met this criteria, and we check the policy
and find that it is and has been in line with their gathered statistical evi-
dence, we should believe the police institution when they claim that the
policy was made to lower crime rates, and not to discriminate in accor-
dance with race. However, the police institution does not go off free. As
mentioned earlier, racial profiling is a case with background injustice, in
which the three accounts recounted earlier in the previous section are rel-
evant. With a system that includes a regulatory body, we can also include
the discussion of background injustice in the conversation of what kinds
of statistical evidence the regulatory body should accept. When the regu-
latory body is deciding what kinds of statistics are appropriate for which
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kinds of policies, special attention can be made to protected classes.
In the discussion of police regulation, we seem to be comfortable with
measures like police body cameras. Surveillance methods that would be
inappropriate to demand on individuals seem permissible when surveilling
institutions. We saw this kind of institution/individual asymmetry in the
discussion of the restaurant and dinner party case, where the threat to
public safety in a restaurant is considered to be more serious than that of
a dinner party. As we consider measures like police body cameras, we
should also consider measures not only to surveil the members of public
institutions, but the policies of public institutions.
4.3 Employment
I will close this discussion by examining employability reports. We al-
ready have many restrictions on what employers may consider when think-
ing about who to hire. While generated hiring reports are already being
used by large companies, it seems like they are much more hesitant to
automate their hiring process like one might be tempted to automate the
tagging of items at a CVS. However, even procedures that are designed
to filter out applicants can be problematic. Additionally, we have at least
one example of an automated employment process that was mentioned
earlier. The pseudo-taxi company Uber automatically fires drivers when
their approval scores dip below a certain threshold.
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Consider our system approaching something like “days since last job”
as a proposed statistic to use in hiring procedures. While this may seem in-
nocent, this statistic has been accused as a proxy for discriminating against
recently pregnant women and the chronically ill, who may need extended
time off from work to attend to other responsibilities. Currently, many
states have responded by preventing employer from posting “unemployed
need not apply” conditions in their applications. In this system, the regu-
latory body should catch this attempted proxy and deny that the statistic is
appropriate for use in policy. The job of a CEO determined to discriminate
against pregnant women through deference to statistics becomes much
harder. They need to find some statistic which will pass the scrutiny of the
regulatory body that will reliably discriminate against pregnant women
and hold up over time as the statistic is published publicly and continually
verified. The statistic should also be a believable measure for competency
in the job at hand. While finding such a statistic is not impossible, it is, at
the very least extremely difficult.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
We set out to investigate the role of statistics in justifications for institu-
tional policy. First, we took a look at an existing precedent, market share
liability, to see if it would generalize to help with the use of statistics in
justifying institutional policies. Although the principle did generalize,
market share liability is not suited for handling statistical evidence in the
context of institutional policies. We identified some unique problems and
potential abuses that institutions that defer to statistics might commit, and
argued that the use of large scale databases to form policy needs regula-
tion if it is to have force in the court room. Specifically, if we are to believe
an institutions claim that a policy relies on some deference to a statistic,
the policy and the statistic should be transparent, starting from before the
implementation of the policy, and verifiable, for however long the policy
is in place. The broader point I have tried to make is that there is some-
63
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 64
thing deeply wrong with how easily we accept deference to a statistic to be
a morally neutral action. We should give large institutions a very hard time
when they attempt to excuse their actions through deferring to a statistic.
It is easy to hide embarrassing, damaging, or irresponsible actions when
all you have to do to appear free from sin is produce a believable statistic
that supports the action.
Our capacity to collect, analyze, and deploy statistical evidence is grow-
ing quickly, and with it, grows our capacity to keep track of how institu-
tions are using statistical evidence. I can imagine a few years down the
line, something like CVS’s claimed database will pop up, and when it in-
evitably produces apparently discriminatory results, we should be pre-
pared to buckle down and investigate what is going on in these, some-
times murky, systems. I believe that it is a near inevitability that systems
that track and collect a large amount of statistical evidence will start to in-
clude analysis features that are meant to inform policy. Crystal Commerce,
an inventory tracking system, is only a few lines of code from offering a
sorted list of most often stolen items. Salesforce, a customer relationship
tracking program, is similarly only a few lines of code from suggesting
which classes of people donate the most and to what cause. We should
work hard to set the expectation that these large scale systems stay trans-
parent and verifiable, for the analytic power that these systems provide,
combined with the institutional power given to policy makers, make for a
dangerous combination.
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